[Vol. 41 :325 should facilitate such bargaining by reducing transaction costs. 5 However, as James Buchanan has argued, when the Theorem is extended to a theory of the state, "new and previously nonexistent 'rights of decision' are brought into being, rights that have economic value that is potentially capturable by the subset of the citizenry empowered to make decisions on behalf of all. " 6 Monitoring the officials who exercise rights of decision is costly. The diverse output of government is not amenable to expression in a few statistics (as are the profitability and risk of a public corporation, for example), and, as presentment shows, many government decisions are joint products of several agents in separate branches-a distribution of responsibilities that invites shirking. 7 Monitoring costs are reduced, and political accountability enhanced, by prohibiting bargains that alter the Constitution's formal allocation of rights of decision among political actors. 8 One might describe this proposition as the "Inverse Coase Theorem." Koh apparently has misunderstood my basic point; he claims that constitutional controversies cannot satisfy the Coase Theorem's underlying assumptions. 9 If only this were true, I would be the last to complain. It would be desirable if an absence of necessary conditions in addition to zero transaction costs thwarted the reallocation of rights of decision. 10 But obviously the executive and legislative branches do make bargains that reallocate constitutional rights of 5. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcONOMICS IOI (1988); Robert Coottr, The Cost of Coose, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14-20 (1982 )), Koh also states that "analogizing constitutional powers to 'property rights' oversimplifies to the point of distortion" because "separation of powers principles do not draw sharp boundaries between congressional and presidential authorities in foreign affairs." Koh, supra note 3, at 130. One could say the same about the use of the air by one party to dry laundry and by another to dispose of sooty exhaust. Why should it be harder to define the war powers (and duties) of the President and Congress than to define property rights in the electromagnetic spectrum (which Coase was studying when he had the insight for The Problem of Social Cost, see Coase, supra note 1, at I n. l ( discussing Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. I (1959)))? For a more decision. Curiously, after Koh says that this practice is impossible, he lauds the occasions where it does happen-an interesting position in that it is both empirically false and logically self-contradictory. 11 Koh's hypothetical, in which the President's trespassing cattle damage Congress's crops, also shows how he has missed my point. 12 My point is that there are agency costs associated with some kinds of cooperative behavior between the branches. If the President (ranch manager) and the Congress (farm manager) were mutually to agree to share something that belonged to the People (landowner), then the hypothetical would be relevant. In the Persian Gulf War, Congress and the President mutually agreed to ignore the constitutionally required formality of declaring war when in fact initiating full-scale offensive war, all to the detriment of the principal-"We the People"-of whom both the President and Congress are supposed to be agents.
If the branches do trade rights of decision, it becomes more difficult for a citizen to know which branch is responsible for a particular decision. He therefore incurs higher cost in petitioning government. Moreover, the locus of a decision can alter the decision itself. Such factors as the different discount rates for assessing policy options implied by the 12. See Koh, supra note 3, at 13 I.
